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The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?
Erwin Chemerinsky*
The following essay is based on a presentation given by
Professor Erwin Chermerinsky on 22 October 1998.
From the perspective of public interest law, the Rehnquist Court,
simply put, is a disaster. One might think that is terribly harsh, but I
seek to show its accuracy and explain that the Rehnquist Court is an
activist, conservative Court. It is activist in the sense that it shows
little deference to the majoritarian branches of government and in the
sense that it has little respect for precedent. It is conservative, not in
the sense that it is following conservative judicial principles, but rather
it is conservative in the sense that it is animated by the right-wing
political agenda. In order to demonstrate this, I will describe five
principles, which I believe account for the vast majority of the
Rehnquist Court’s decisions. Certainly, these five statements cannot
explain all of the Court’s constitutional law decisions, but I would
suggest that it can explain most.
The first principle that explains many of the Rehnquist Court’s
decisions is that in conflicts between the federal and state
governments, state governments win. When constitutional historians
look back at the Rehnquist Court, they will say that its most dramatic
contribution to constitutional law was in the area of federalism. There
are three main examples of how the Rehnquist Court has accomplished
what I believe is truly a revolution in constitutional jurisprudence.
First, the Court has greatly narrowed the scope of Congress’ powers,
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science, of
the University of Southern California.  I want to thank Washington University, and especially Jane
Aiken and Karen Tokarz, for inviting me to participate in the public-interest law lecture series and
for their wonderful hospitality.  This talk is based on a paper delivered at a conference on the
Rehnquist Court at Tulsa University Law School in September 1998 and that will be published as
a part of a book on the Rehnquist Court by Oxford University Press.
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and it has done so in the name of federalism. For example, in United
States v. Lopez1 in 1995, for the first time in sixty years, the Supreme
Court struck down a federal law as exceeding the scope of Congress’
powers under the Commerce Clause. In Lopez the Court declared
unconstitutional the Gun-Free School Zones Act2 by saying it
exceeded the scope of Congress’ authority to regulate interstate
commerce. It is notable that the decision, like so many others I will
talk about, was five-four. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion
for the Court, joined by Justice O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.
The Court has not only narrowed Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause, but it has done so in other areas as well. Consider
the decision from June 1997 in City of Boerne v. Flores.3 The
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,4 an important federal statute that safeguarded the free
exercise of religion. The Supreme Court said that Congress, when it
acts under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, may not
expand the scope of rights or create new rights. It may only provide
remedies for the rights recognized by the courts.
In 1966 in Katzenbach v. Morgan5 the Supreme Court came to the
opposite conclusion. In Katzenbach the Supreme Court said Section
Five empowers Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, said that so long as Congress is
expanding rights and not diluting rights it is within Congress’
authority to act. City of Boerne v. Flores, however, implicitly
overrules Katzenbach. Boerne also puts in jeopardy major federal
statutes, like the Americans with Disabilities Act6 and the 1982
Amendments of the Voting Rights Act7 that also expand the scope of
rights.
A second way in which the Supreme Court has protected
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922.
3. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
5. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-b.
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federalism is by using the Tenth Amendment. In the first third of this
century, the Supreme Court interpreted the Tenth Amendment as
reserving a zone of activities for state governments, and the Court
struck down federal laws that were seen as usurping state
prerogatives. Yet, from 1937 until 1992 there was only one Supreme
Court case invalidating a statute for violating the Tenth Amendment,
and that Supreme Court decision was later expressly overruled. In
1992 in New York v. United States,8 th  Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act9
on the grounds that it forced states to clean up their nuclear waste and
conscripted the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the federal Brady
Act10 in 1997 with Printz v. United States.11 Th  Brady Bill requires
that state and local law enforcement personnel do background checks
before issuing permits for firearms. In a five-four decision the
Supreme Court said that this is conscripting state and local law
enforcement personnel and violates the Tenth Amendment. Justice
Scalia wrote the majority opinion and Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Thomas joined his opinion.
There is a third way in which the Supreme Court has used
federalism to protect states and limit federal power. The Eleventh
Amendment says that the judicial power of the United States shall not
extend to suits against the state brought by citizens of other states or
citizens of foreign countries. In 1989 in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,12
the Supreme Court said that Congress may override by statute the
Eleventh Amendment and may authorize suits against states so long as
the law, in its text, is clear in authorizing such litigation. The Supreme
Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, however, in 1996 with
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.13 The Court said that Congress
8. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b-2021j (1999).
10. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.
11. 521 U.S. 98 (1997).
12. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
13. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (finding unconstitutional the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
U.S.C. § 2701-2721 (1988). In June 1999, after this Article went to press, the Court decided Alder
v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999), Florida Prepaid Postsecondary v. College Savings Bank, 119
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may not use its Commerce Clause authority to override the Eleventh
Amendment and authorize suits against the states. All of these
decisions were decisions about protecting states from federal power.
My goal is not to critique these decisions; time does not allow it.
Rather, I want to use these decisions to show you that the Rehnquist
Court is activist and conservative. It is activist in the sense that all of
these decisions invalidate federal statutes. These cases were not about
deference to the majority; they invalidated popular federal laws: the
Gun-Free School Zones Act,14 the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act,15 the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act,16 the Brady Bill,17
and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.18 Congress passed most of
these statutes overwhelmingly and sometimes almost unanimously.
These decisions also are all about overruling or ignoring precedent.
Lopez was the first time in sixty years that the Court found a federal
statute to exceed the scope of Congress’ commerce power. The Tenth
Amendment cases were virtually unprecedented in the previous sixty
years. Seminole Tribe overruled a prior case that was only seven years
old. What was the difference between 1989 when Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas was decided and 1996 when Seminole Tribe was decided?
Was it that the Supreme Court found a musty, long lost history of the
Eleventh Amendment? Was it that Pennsylvania v. Union Gas proved
unworkable? No, it was simply the change in the composition of the
Court. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas was a five-four decision. Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, White, and Stevens supported the majority
judgment, while Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy dissented.
Four of the five supporting the majority judgment had left the Court
by 1996. All four of the dissenters remained, and Justice Thomas
joined them; now they had five votes. Stare decisis, a principle of
restraint, did not get in their way. Notice that these decisions are
politically conservative rulings. As I said virtually every one of them
S. Ct. 2199 (1999), and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary, 119 S. Ct.
2219 (1999), which further expanded states’ sovereign immunity.
14. 514 U.S. 549.
15. 521 U.S. 507.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b.
17. Id.
18. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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was five-four, and the most conservative Justices were in the majority.
These rulings were animated by the long-standing conservative
commitment to federalism. Throughout American history it generally
has been conservatives who tried to use federalism to frustrate federal
efforts, and that is what happened in all of these cases.
A second statement that explains many of the Rehnquist Court’s
decisions is that it upholds conservative moral legislation, especially
laws concerning sex, drugs, and gambling. If nothing else, this is a
predictor of what the Rehnquist Court is likely to do in many cases,
but I also think it shows how much it is animated by conservative
philosophy.
Consider each of these areas, starting with sex, and a Supreme
Court case, Bennis v. Michigan, 19 from a couple of years ago. A man
in Michigan stopped and picked up a prostitute. A police officer saw
them and arrested them for lewd and indecent behavior and for
prostitution. The State of Michigan, pursuant to its nuisance law,
seized the automobile to abate a public nuisance. However, his wife,
Tina Bennis, jointly owned the car. She said, “I am an innocent owner.
The government should not be able to take away my property when I
did nothing wrong.” In a five-four decision the Supreme Court ruled
against Tina Bennis and upheld the ability of the government to seize
the automobile, although the automobile was, at best, incidental to the
crime committed.
Another example regarding sex is a case from 1993 called
Alexander v. United States.20 F rris Alexander owned a chain of adult
bookstores and movie theaters in Minnesota. The government
prosecuted him for selling fifteen obscene items. The jury concluded
that seven of the items were obscene. He was sentenced to six years in
prison, and he was fined a hundred thousand dollars. If the story
stopped here, one might say this is a very substantial penalty for
violating obscenity laws, but it does not end here. The federal
government, pursuant to the federal RICO law,21 seized the entire
19. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
20. 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
21. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §1963 (1988
ed. and Supp. III).
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contents of all of his stores. The federal government then literally
burned all of the books and magazines and crushed all of the
videotapes. According to Alexander the merchandise was worth
twenty-five million dollars; the federal government said it was only
worth nine million dollars. The Supreme Court accepted the nine-
million-dollar figure.
Ferris Alexander sued and said this violates the First Amendment.
What is a clearer prior restraint (one of the most egregious
infringements on First Amendment rights) than this? The jury deemed
only seven of the items obscene, but the government destroyed at least
nine million dollars worth of merchandise. In a five-four decision the
United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the federal government
and ruled against Ferris Alexander. It is hard to explain the decision
under First Amendment doctrine. To me, the only explanation is that
the case was about sex and the conservative moral condemnation of
obscenity.
With regard to drugs, many commentators have said that the
Rehnquist Court has essentially carved a drug exception to the Fourth
Amendment. If the case involves drugs and there is a Fourth
Amendment claim, the government virtually always wins, especially if
the case involves cars. The most conservative Justices on the
Rehnquist Court proclaim the need to follow the framers’ intent. I am
skeptical that one can ever know the framers’ intent, but if ever one
can, it is with the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the framers of the
Fourth Amendment wanted there to be individualized suspicion before
a person is searched. There must be reason to believe that a particular
person committed a crime or has evidence of a crime before there may
be a search. For the first time, the Rehnquist Court has authorized
broad, warrantless searches without any individualized suspicion.
Consider the random drug testing cases. In 1989 in Von Rahb v.
National Treasury Employees Union,22 the Supreme Court upheld
random drug testing for those applying for jobs or promotions within
the Customs Service. The Solicitor General’s Office, appearing before
the Supreme Court during oral arguments, conceded that there was no
22. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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evidence of a drug problem in the Customs Service. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court upheld the warrantless random searches five-four.
Also consider Vernonia School District v. Acton23 from three years
ago. This case involved a high school that required all student athletes
to submit to random, warrantless searches. This is the antithesis of the
individualized suspicion that the framers had in mind. In fact, this is
equivalent to the general warrant that the framers were reacting
against, yet the Rehnquist Court has approved it.
In 1989 with United States v. Sokolow24 the Supreme Court
approved searches based on drug courier profiles. The drug courier
profiles use such general language that almost anyone could fit within
them. If someone looks particularly nervous or particularly relaxed,
either would be enough to trigger part of the drug courier profile.
There is not enough for individualized suspicion there, yet the
Supreme Court approved this in its effort to enable the government to
combat drugs.
So far I have talked about sex and drugs; gambling is another
example of a conservative moral judgment. Generally, the Rehnquist
Court has been protective of commercial speech. Consider the case of
United States v. Edge Broadcasting25 from 1993, however. It involved
a radio station near the southern end of Virginia. Ninety-five percent
of its listeners were in North Carolina. North Carolina has a lottery;
Virginia does not. The North Carolina lottery wanted to advertise on
this Virginia radio station. There is a federal law that says that there
may be advertising for a lottery only if it is in a state that has a lottery.
Since Virginia does not and North Carolina does, the radio station
could not play the advertisement. This would seem to be an easy First
Amendment case. It is commercial speech. It is not misleading. It
concerns legal activities in North Carolina. What could be the
problem? It is even legal for somebody to go from Virginia to North
Carolina to buy a lottery ticket. The Supreme Court upheld the federal
law. It said that the government has an important interest in
23. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
24. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
25. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
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discouraging gambling and that prohibiting the advertising is
substantially related to that goal.
The third statement that explains much of what the Rehnquist
Court has done is that no new fundamental rights have been
recognized, and many existing constitutional rights have been greatly
narrowed. The Rehnquist Court has existed now for twelve years.
There is not a single example where the Rehnquist Court has
recognized a new right that would trigger heightened scrutiny. For
example, in 1997 in Washington v. Glucksberg26 and in Vacco v.
Quill,27 the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the contention that
there should be a right to physician-assisted suicide.
Unfortunately, it is not just the failure to recognize new rights; it is
a substantial narrowing of existing rights. It is true the Rehnquist
Court did not overrule Roe v. Wade,28 but I think many people draw
from that the wrong conclusion—that the Rehnquist Court overall has
not narrowed rights. Such a conclusion is false. Consider a couple of
examples of rights that were well established before the Rehnquist
Court but subsequently were narrowed dramatically, such as the Free
Exercise Clause and Employment Division v. Smith29 from 1990. For
over three decades it was clear when a person claims that a
government law substantially burdens religion, the government would
have the obligation to justify the law by meeting strict scrutiny—
showing that the law was necessary to achieve a compelling state
purpose. This changed in 1990, however, when the Court decided
Employment Division v. Smith, often referred to as the Native
American Peyote case. Oregon law prohibited the consumption of
peyote, a hallucinogenic substance. Native Americans argued that
their religious rituals required the use of peyote, and they brought a
challenge based on the Free Exercise Clause.
If the Supreme Court wanted to rule in favor of the State and
against the Native Americans, it could have done so under strict
scrutiny. It could have said that stopping the use of hallucinogenic
26. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
27. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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substances is a compelling state interest, but that is not what the
Supreme Court did. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia fashioned
a new test for the Free Exercise Clause. The Court said that neutral
laws of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause,
so long as the law was not motivated by a desire to interfere with
religion and so long as it applies to everyone. Since the Oregon law
prohibiting consumption of peyote met these new criteria there is no
basis for a Free Exercise Challenge.
To get a sense of how radical this is in changing the law, think of a
county that prohibits all consumption of alcohol. There are a few in
the United States. Imagine that a priest wants to use wine in
communion or a Jewish family wants to use wine in a Sabbath or
Seder at a dinner. Before Smith it is clear that the priest or the Jewish
family would win. Now it is clear that they would lose. The law
prohibiting consumption of alcohol was not motivated by a desire to
interfere with religion; it applies to everyone. Therefore, it is
constitutional.
If one looks at both the Supreme Court and the lower court cases
dealing with the Free Exercise Clause for the last several decades,
virtually all of them involved challenges to neutral laws of general
applicability that substantially burden religion. Smith means that now
all such challenges lose; the Free Exercise Clause has essentially
vanished from the Constitution. Congress tried to overturn this with
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, yet the Supreme Court
declared that unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores.30
With regard to the narrowing of rights, another example concerns
the parental right to custody or at least to visitation of one’s children,
such as in the case called Michael H. v. Gerald D. 31 from 1989. This
case involved a married woman who had an affair and conceived a
child as a result of the affair. She did not divorce her husband, but she
moved in with the child and the biological father for a year and a half.
After this time, she and the child rejoined her husband. The biological
father sued for visitation rights. However, California had a law that
30. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
31. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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said if a married woman has a child, there was an irrebuttable
presumption that her husband was the father of the child.
It has long been established by the Supreme Court that the right to
custody, at least the right to visitation, is a fundamental right. In
Stanley v. Illinois32 in 1972 the Supreme Court declared that
unmarried fathers have a fundamental right to custody of their
children. Stanley involved an Illinois law that said if an unmarried
mother died or gave up custody, the child would automatically be put
up for adoption. The Supreme Court declared the Illinois law
unconstitutional, proclaiming the fundamental right of unmarried
fathers.
The Rehnquist Court in a five-four decision ruled against the
unmarried father in Michael H. v. Gerald D. by upholding the
California law. Writing both for the majority and in part for plurality,
Justice Scalia said that there is no tradition of protecting unmarried
fathers when the mother is married to someone else. Therefore, there is
no constitutional right in this instance for the unmarried father, even to
visitation. This decision is a substantial and dramatic narrowing of
this parental right.
A fourth statement that explains much of what the Rehnquist Court
has done is that no new suspect classifications have been recognized,
and the Court has been consistently hostile to currently existing
suspect classifications when such involves affirmative action efforts
and school desegregation efforts. In the entire twelve-year history of
the Rehnquist Court, it has not found any additional types of
discrimination to warrant intermediate or strict scrutiny. The
categories or types of discrimination that get heightened scrutiny are
the same in 1998 as they were in 1986 when the Rehnquist Court
began. For example, in Heller v. Doe33 the Supreme Court said that
discrimination based on disability gets only rational basis review. In
Romer v. Evans34 the Court used only rational basis review in striking
down blatant discrimination based on sexual orientation.
32. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
33. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
34. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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In addition to its refusal to recognize new suspect classifications,
the Court has been very hostile to efforts to remedy past
discrimination, such as affirmation action. The Rehnquist Court
repeatedly has proclaimed that affirmative action efforts should
receive the same level of scrutiny as invidious discrimination against
racial minorities. It is also interesting here to look at the progression of
the Rehnquist Court’s decisions. In 1989 in J.A. Croson v. City of
Richmond,35 the Supreme Court said state and local affirmative action
efforts must meet strict scrutiny. In 1990 in Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC,36 the Supreme Court said if Congress approves the affirmative
action effort, intermediate scrutiny should be used. The Court stated
that Congress has special powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to remedy past discrimination. However, in 1995 the
Supreme Court overruled Metro Broadcasting with Adarand
Constructors v. Pena.37 The Court said strict scrutiny applies to all
affirmative action efforts.
What was the difference between 1990 when the Court decided
Metro Broadcasting and 1995 when Adarand came down? Did they
discover a new history of the Fourteenth Amendment or Article I
powers? Was it that Metro Broadcasting proved unworkable? No,
again it is that four Justices in the majority left the Court from 1990 to
1995, and the four dissenters remained and were joined by Justice
Thomas. Even though the precedent was just five years old, they now
had the votes and they overruled it.
The other thing that is notable about affirmative action efforts is
the lack of deference that the Court shows to democratic, majoritarion
processes. All of the affirmative action cases concerned voluntary
efforts by the government to achieve racial equality. Ironically, a
Court that so often proclaims the need to defer to the majority struck
them down.
It is interesting that the most conservative Justices on the Rehnquist
Court say that the original meaning of constitutional provisions should
35. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
36. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
37. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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guide the Court in its decision making. For example, Justice Scalia
writes in both his academic writings and in his opinions that the Court
should look for original intent or original meaning behind the
constitutional margins. Scalia maintains that one finds original
meaning from the contemporaneous practices at the time a
constitutional provision or amendment was adopted.
For instance, when the Court in Wilson v. Arkansas38 decided
whether the police must knock and announce before searching a
dwelling, the Court looked to police practices in 1791. When the Court
decided in McIntyre v. Ohio39 whether it was a First Amendment right
to circulate anonymous literature, the Court looked to the practices in
1791. Therefore, one would think that Scalia and Thomas, who
proclaim fidelity to originality, would look to the racially-based,
remedial practices around the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted. What is striking in the period from 1865 to 1875 is the extent
of what we now call affirmative action, the extent to which the federal
government was adopting race-conscious programs to help minorities,
especially in the South. Scalia and Thomas’ opinions do not include a
word about original meaning or even acknowledge the affirmative
action that occurred after the Civil War.
The same hostility that the Supreme Court has shown to
affirmative action is also evidenced in school desegregation efforts.
There have been three major Rehnquist Court decisions concerning
school desegregation. The first, Board of Education of Oklahoma City
Public Schools v. Dowell,40 is from the early 1990s. Oklahoma was a
state that had segregated schools mandated by law until 1971.
Oklahoma City was also a city with a very successful busing program.
The result of busing was that there were virtually no majority black
schools. However, a federal district court found that since the busing
effort had been in place for a long period of time, the school system
was now unitary and the busing efforts should cease.41 The re ult of
the end to busing in Oklahoma City was that more than half of the
38. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
39. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
40. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
41. 606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
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black students would attend schools that were more than ninety-
percent black. The end of busing effectively meant the re-segregation
of the schools. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court said that once a school
system is “unitary” all desegregation efforts should end, even if it
would mean the re-segregation of the schools.
The Court next decided Freeman v. Pitts,42 which involved a public
school system in Georgia. The system was segregated in every respect,
and the federal court issued a five-point plan for desegregation. The
school district met only part of the plan. The school wanted to build a
brand new facility in a white area of town. A black plaintiff class
sought to enjoin construction of the facility. The Rehnquist Court held
that once a school district meets a portion of a desegregation order,
court supervision of that part of the plan should cease, even if in other
respects it is still a segregated system.
Finally, the Court decided Missouri v. Jenkins,43 which concerned
the desegregation of Kansas City schools. A district court judge found
that because there was continued tremendous disparity between the
test scores of black and white students the district had not achieved a
unitary system. The Supreme Court said that disparities in
performance are irrelevant. Once a desegregation order has been in
place for a period of time and there is a unitary school system, that
should be the end of federal court supervision in desegregation efforts.
During the Vietnam War, Vermont Senator George Aiken said the
United States should declare victory in Vietnam and withdraw. The
Rehnquist Court is saying something very similar; it is declaring
victory over the problem of school segregation and having the federal
courts withdraw. They are saying this even though public schools in
the United States are more segregated today than any other time since
1954 and even though today much less is spent, on average, on a black
child’s elementary and secondary education than on a white child’s
education in the United States.
There is a fifth and final statement that I am offering to explain
what the Rehnquist Court has done, and that is that criminal
42. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
43. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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defendants virtually always lose and especially so in capital cases. The
Rehnquist Court’s attitude towards capital punishment has simply
been to speed up the executions, even if it means ignoring the law. One
example involves a man by the name of Robert Alton Harris. The
Wednesday before Good Friday in 1992, the governor of California
denied Robert Alton Harris’ petition for clemency. The execution was
scheduled for the following Tuesday (actually Monday night at
midnight). On Friday, which was both Good Friday and the first Seder
of Passover, Robert Alton Harris’ lawyers filed a lawsuit in federal
district court in San Francisco pursuant to Section 198344 and alleged
civil rights violations.
The lawsuit said that execution in the gas chamber—then the sole
means prescribed for execution in California—was cruel and unusual
punishment. There was much evidence to support this, such as
scientific evidence of the effects of the cyanide gas on the human body.
There were descriptions of the suffering that people went through
when they died in this way. There was also the fact that most states in
the United States had abandoned the gas chamber, but not California.
After a lengthy hearing, the federal district court issued a
temporary restraining order45 on Friday against the use of the gas
chamber in California, the effect of which would be to stop Harris’
execution that was scheduled for Monday night. The State’s attorneys
filed an immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On Sunday evening the
three judges decided to have an immediate telephone oral argument,
although only the government had filed its brief. Harris’ lawyer did not
have a chance to file a brief, and the judges gave no prior notice that
they were going to hold oral arguments that night. On Monday—this is
the day for which the execution was scheduled—the panel issued its
decision overturning the district judge’s temporary restraining order.46
Under Ninth Circuit precedents, an appellate court should rarely
overturn a temporary restraining order; there must be a showing of
abuse of discretion by the district court.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999).
45. Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
46. Gomez v. U.S. District Court for the N.D. of Cal., 966 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1992).
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The panel decision was at best curious, but actually clearly wrong
as to the law. The panel decision said that the federal district court
erred based on Younger v. Harris47 bstention. Younger v. Harris held
that a federal court should not enjoin pending state court proceedings.
If there is a case ongoing in state court, the federal court may not issue
an order to enjoin it. Based on this the court of appeals said that the
district court erred in issuing its temporary restraining order. There is
one problem though; there was no pending state court proceeding.
Younger v. Harris was completely inapplicable. The court was simply
wrong.
That afternoon ten judges on the Ninth Circuit issued a stay of the
panel’s order. This had the effect of stopping the execution to allow
time for the entire Ninth Circuit to vote as to whether or not to grant
en banc review. That night, shortly after midnight, the Supreme Court
lifted the ten judges’ stay.48 The Supreme Court said that this case was
barred as a successive habeas corpus petition. A year earlier the
Supreme Court ruled that individuals could bring one, and only one,
habeas corpus petition unless they could show cause and prejudice, or
actual innocence.
There is a huge problem with what the Supreme Court said here.
Robert Alton Harris’ did not file his suit as a habeas corpus petition.
He filed it as a Section 1983 suit, and thus the bar against successive
habeas corpus petitions was not relevant. The second paragraph of the
three-paragraph Supreme Court opinion said that principles of equity
counsel against hearing this suit because he waited too long before
filing it. Equity requires that a court balance the hardships to the
parties involved. What was the hardship to the State of California in
waiting a month or two before putting Robert Alton Harris to death?
Of course, on the other hand, the hardship to Robert Alton Harris was
an unconstitutional execution. At that point a single judge of the Ninth
Circuit issued yet another stay of execution. This judge said that if the
Supreme Court wants to treat this as a habeas corpus petition, there is
a rule that says a petitioner must exhaust state remedies before coming
47. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
48. Gomez v. U.S. District Court for the N.D. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
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to the federal courts with a habeas corpus petition. Harris, then,
should have a chance to go to state court and raise this.
The Supreme Court then overturned that stay of execution and
issued an order of no further stays of execution. The Supreme Court
has no authority under any statute or precedent to stop federal courts
from issuing stays. To me, what the Robert Alton Harris case was all
about is that the Supreme Court has simply concluded that there are
too many delays concerning executions and it should make sure the
trains run on time. The state executed Robert Alton Harris at six
o’clock that morning, just six hours behind schedule.
There are other more systematic examples concerning the death
penalty; consider the case of Collins v. Herrera.49 An individual
brought a successive habeas corpus petition and claimed that there
was substantial evidence that he was actually innocent. Earlier, the
Court had indicated if a person is able to produce evidence of actual
innocence, it would allow another habeas petition. The Supreme Court
still ruled against him five-four, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist. He said actual innocence is not sufficient. There must also
be an allegation of a constitutional violation.
Notice what Rehnquist’s opinion means. Even if a person can
prove that he or she is innocent of the crime, that is not enough to stop
the execution unless there is proof of a constitutional violation. To me,
executing an innocent person is the most profound of all constitutional
violations, but apparently a majority of the Supreme Court disagrees.
Hopefully, I have successfully shown what I said when I started:
the Rehnquist Court is an activist, conservative Court. I said I wanted
to say that it is activist in the sense that it is not deferring to the
majority, and it is not following precedent. I said I wanted to show that
it is conservative, that it is very much animated by conservative,
Republican values and not in adherence to consistent constitutional
philosophy or principles. I said that I also wanted to talk about the
Rehnquist Court in the perspective of public interest law. To me,
public interest law is ultimately about compassion and caring. To me,
the Jewish phrase and tradition “Tikkun Olem”—to heal a broken
49. 506 U.S. 390 (1992).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol1/iss1/5
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world—best describes public interest law. That is what I hope my
students will aspire to, to use their legal training in their law careers to
heal a broken world.
Yet, when you look at the Rehnquist Court, where do you see any
evidence of compassion and caring? Where do you see any evidence of
a commitment to healing a broken world? Although it may be harsh,
when we talk about the Rehnquist Court and justice, it really is an
oxymoron.
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